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We study the incentives induced by the adoption of a Code of Best Practice. Us-
ing an agency model, we analyze whether and when ￿rms are interested in adopting
a Code that allows the shareholder to reduce the manager￿ s discretion. Our results
suggest that if a voluntary Code is available, not all ￿rms will be interested in it.
In ￿rms that do adopt it, the Code is not always used to reach more e¢ ceint out-
comes. Regarding investment decisions, we show that a proper design of a Code
can alleviate the distortions caused by the agency problem at the investment level.
Finally, we analyze some features that a regulator protecting shareholder￿ s wealth
should consider. Our ￿ndings suggest that heterogeneity in Codes may be partially
explained by di⁄erences in the distribution of ￿rms or by di⁄erent abilities of the
regulator.
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Separation of ownership and control is one of the main characteristics of any limited
company. Although the bene￿ts that arise from this separation are important,1 it involves
some costs, as well. These costs are known as the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling,
1976, Fama and Jensen, 1983). Generally, the manager retains signi￿cant control rights
(discretion) and makes choices in order to maximize his own utility, where his objectives
typically di⁄er from those of owners. This may lead to very undesirable situations for
the ￿rm￿ s owners. In extreme cases, it can even produce the collapse of ￿rms, as it has
recently happened in US (Enron, WorldCom and Tyco) and in Europe (Parmalat).
Since many of the manager￿ s decisions cannot be determined ex-ante in a contract,
shareholders use a variety of mechanisms of corporate governance to alleviate this agency
problem. Examples of these mechanisms are the remuneration schemes contingent on the
￿rm￿ s performance, the use of a large claimholder that can monitor the manager or the
market for corporate control (raiders). The main objective of these mechanisms is to align
the interests of the manager with the ones of the shareholder.2
During the last decade, both private and public organizations, have started suggesting
the use of a new normative device, known as a Code of Best Practice, in order to reduce this
manager￿ s problem (EU, 2000). In general terms, a Code of Best practice, also considered
as a "soft law", can be de￿ned as a set of rules of voluntary adoption that suggest how
a ￿rm should supervise management.3 A Code of Best Practice bears on wide aspects
related to the ￿rm￿ s governance; it a⁄ects executive compensation, the role of auditors,
disclosure, shareholder voting and capital structure or the role of large shareholders and
anti-takeover devices. However, the main recommendations suggested by a Code of Best
Practice focus on the board￿ s control over manager￿ s decisions.4
1For instance, an investor will be able to construct a well diversi￿ed portfolio, and hence reduce the
risk. Analogously, owners can contract professionals that are better prepared to take charge of the ￿rm.
2See for instance the survey by Shlei⁄er and Vishny (1997) in which the di⁄erent control mechanisms
are investigated. Murphy (1999) presents an extense survey about executive compensation.
3By management we refer to top executives such as CEO, Chief Executive O¢ cer.
4Some of the topics included in the recommendations include board membership criteria, separation
of the role of chairman of the board and CEO, board size, the frequency of board meetings, the pro-
portion of inside versus outside (and independent) directors, the appointment of former executives as
directors, evaluation of board performance, the existence, number and structure of board committees,








This new trend begins with the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992, which
includes a Code of Best Practice that it is considered the reference Code, as a consequence
of ￿nancial scandals arising at the end of the 80￿ s.5 Following this trend almost all
countries in Europe have created their own Code. We just mention the Preda Report
(1999) in Italy, the Olivencia Report (1998) in Spain, Vienot I Report (1995) in France
or the Peter￿ s Report (1997) in the Netherlands. In Asia, we ￿nd Codes for instance in
China, Japan, India or Indonesia. In America, there are Codes of Best Practice in Brazil,
Mexico, Canada, the U.S. or Peru. Even transnational organizations have been working in
the composition of Codes, as for instance, the Commonwealth, the OECD or the ICGN.6
Empirical studies describing the consequences of the use of Codes of Best Practice lead
to results that are not very conclusive. For instance, Dahya et al. (2002) and Dedman
(2000) ￿nds that the adoption of a Code leads to an improvement in the board￿ s control
(Dahya et al, 2002, or Dedman, 2000), while in other cases the adoption of the Code
does not have e⁄ects in this dimension, as documented by Jong et al. (2002).7 We want
to add to the discussion by providing a theoretical model that can help understand this
contradictory empirical evidence.
We model the Code assuming that it has an e⁄ect on the board￿ s control. On the one
hand, the introduction of the Code of Best Practices makes the manager play with some
rules that improve the monitoring by the board (Dahya et al., 2002). On the other hand,
the introduction of a Code of Best Practices (like the Cadbury report) also produced
an intense debate about the validity of the self-regulation norms. For instance, the CBI
5At the end of the 80￿ s, UK was in crisis after a decade of growth. Obviously, some ￿rms got losses.
Yet, some of these collapses were spectacular. Firms like Coloroll, Maxwell￿ s MCC or BCCI got very
bad performances. The London Stock Exchange, the Financial Review Council and the Accountancy
Profession set the Cadbury Commitee since they considered that these collapses were caused by a lack of
Corporate Governance. In particular, the regulators considered that these failures were characterized by
a lack of internal control and an excess power of the leader￿ s company (CEO).
6The ECGI (European Corporate Governance Institute) provides a webpage (www.ecgi.org updated
regularly) where any Code can be checked.
7Since the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992, there has been an intense debate in the UK not
only about the validity of a few features of the Code but also about the way it should be implemented.
For instance, investment groups considered that the Code￿ s reccomendations did not solve completely the
internal control problem or even some executives wanted a mandatory backing for the Cadbury Report.








and IoD8 considered that a Code was too bureaucratic, which in turn could a⁄ect ￿rm￿ s
competitiveness.9 We model these two e⁄ects by considering that the Code allows the
shareholder to reduce manager￿ s discretion at a cost (borne by the manager) of following
some predetermined rules.
We introduce a Code in an agency problem where the shareholders cannot fully con-
tract manager￿ s decisions. We ￿rst consider this situation in the traditional framework
where the shareholders design an incentive mechanism to motivate the manager. Second,
we de￿ne a Code as a mechanism that allows the shareholder to increase control over
manager￿ s decisions and analyze the e⁄ects of its introduction. Importantly, since the
Code is of voluntary adoption, we show that some ￿rms decide not to adopt the Code.
This is so because its adoption implies some losses: either in terms of a loss in ￿ exibility
or in terms of the adequacy of the decisions the manager makes. We also show that the
shareholder￿ s motivation for adopting the Code relies on the fact that it is a mechanism
that reduces manager￿ s rents. This motivation, though, may improve or decline ￿rm￿ s
e¢ ciency. Some ￿rms adopt the Code and the manager￿ s e⁄ort increases. In other ￿rms,
the manager￿ s e⁄ort is reduced when the Code is adopted.
Third, we analyze di⁄erent investment distortions that may be caused by the agency
problem: underinvestment or overinvestment situations and the abandon of pro￿table
projects. The former situation arises when investment and manager￿ s decisions are com-
plementary, while overinvestment takes place when both are substitutes. We show that a
Code can partially alleviate both problems only if it is properly designed. Quite interest-
ing, we ￿nd that ￿rms might overshoot when deciding the investment level.
Finally, we analyze the design of a Code when the regulator is concerned with share-
holder￿ s pro￿ts. The regulator owns a technology to design Codes of Best Practice. This
technology describes the trade-o⁄ between the ability to design rules that improve board
control and the in￿ exibility that these rules entail in the manager￿ s decision making. Our
results suggest that the design of the Code will be in￿ uenced by the population of ￿rms
as well as by the regulator￿ s technology. If the regulator is facing a low valued industry,
it should provide a ￿ exible Code whereas a rigid Code turns out to be optimal when the
8Conference of British Industry and Institute of Directors, respectively.
9See for instance Financial Times, February 25, 1994. The article points out that the Cadbury
Report (the "benchmark" Code) has too much bearing on monitoring. The author, the BTR￿ s Chairman,








industry is highly valued. Similarly, better technologies will lead the regulator to provide
more rigid Codes.
Since Codes of Best Practice are a recent corporate Governance device, the theoretical
literature regarding this issue is still very scarce. Nevertheless, our approach is related
to some recent literature linking ethics and incentives. Casadesus (2004) and Stevens
and Thevaranjan (2003) introduce the role of ethics in the agency model. For instance,
Casadesus (2004), albeit di⁄erent from our approach, suggests that introducing ethical
standards in the manager￿ s behavior induce him to accept contracts where incentives are
lowered. The manager accepts lowering the incentives because he fears from breaking
ethical standards. In our model, the shareholder (principal) sets an institution (the Code
of Best Practice) as a mechanism that lets the shareholder reduce manager￿ s discretion.
This, in turn, also induces the manager to accept contracts with lower incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. We ￿nd the
optimal contract under symmetric and asymmetric information without a Code, as a
benchmark, in Section 3. In Section 3, a Code of Best Practice is presented. We study
the optimal contract when no Code is available and when the Code is adopted. We
determine the adoption decision of an exogenous Code and their incentives implications
by comparing both situations. Using this result, we investigate in Section 4 the role of a
Code of Best practice at solving problems at the investment decision level. An analysis
of the regulator￿ s policy about the design of a Code is examined in Section 5. Section 6
concludes and presents future research. All proofs are included in an Appendix.
2 The Model.
Consider a ￿rm owned by a shareholder (principal) and assume that she does not have
the skills or she lacks the time to manage the ￿rm. The ￿rm is run by a manager (agent)
who is in charge of ￿nding and implementing a project, as stated in Fama and Jensen
(1983).
The ￿rm has access to the following investment opportunity. At t = 1 the ￿rm can
invest an amount I > 0 in a project that generates a random outcome at t = 2. If no
investment is made, the project is not viable. In Section 3 and 4, the level of investment








level of investment is endogenous.
If the realization of the outcome is "success" the payo⁄ generated by the project is V
while the project generates a payo⁄ of V when the outcome is "failure". The outcome
depends on the manager￿ s decision or e⁄ort that we will denote by e 2 (0;1): Without
loss of generality, we assume that the probability of "success" is given by e and "failure"
is given by (1￿e): Therefore, the net expected value of the project is [eV +(1￿e)V ]￿I
or [V + e￿V ] ￿ I where ￿V ￿ V ￿ V > 0.
The shareholder￿ s expected pro￿ts are:
￿(I;e;w) = V + e￿V ￿ w ￿ I;
where w is the expected amount that the shareholders pay to the manager.
We assume that the manager is risk neutral over income. His utility function takes
the form
Um(w;e) = w ￿ c(e);
where w is the payment scheme and c(e) is the cost of attaining the probability of success
e. This is the traditional moral hazard set up. The cost c(e) associated to the e⁄ort e can
also be interpreted as the (opportunity) cost of working for the ￿rm, that is, the forgone
bene￿t of dedicating e⁄ort e to other activities that only bene￿ts him. The manager￿ s
e⁄ort is, then, interpreted as the time devoted to the ￿rm￿ s interests and not to his own
interests.10 We assume that c(0) = c0(0) = 0 and that c(e) is strictly increasing and convex
for e 2 (0;1). To guarantee an interior solution, we also assume c0(1) = 1;c000(e) ￿ 0:
To have a well-de￿ned moral hazard problem when the manager is assumed to be risk
neutral, we consider that he is endowed with limited liability. The payment he receives
is bounded from below at any state of the world. We assume that w must always be
nonnegative and we also set the manager￿ s reservation utility to be zero.11
10See Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a model where managers enjoy perquisites.
11This reservation utility is the utility associated to the best outside option available to the manager.
This could be a position in another ￿rm or the value of the leisure if the manager chooses not to work.
Setting the limited liability constraint to zero, i.e. the level we set the manager￿ s reservation utility, is









The shareholder considers remuneration scheme of the form:
w if failure
w + ￿w if success:
This type of remuneration mechanism can be interpreted as a ￿xed payment independently
of the outcome and a bonus, denoted ￿w, earned by the manager in case of "success".
For the sake of comparison, imagine for a moment that the manager￿ s e⁄ort is a
veri￿able variable. Hence, the e⁄ort can be included into a contract enforced by the Court
of Law. Thus, in absence of informational asymmetries, the optimal contract (w;￿w;e)




FB = [V + e￿V ￿ I ￿ w ￿ e￿w]
w + e￿w ￿ c(e) ￿ 0 (PC)
w ￿ 0 (LL1)
w + ￿w ￿ 0 (LL2)
that is, the shareholder maximizes pro￿ts by selecting the level of e⁄ort and the payment
scheme (w;￿W;e) such that the manager accepts to participate (PC), and limited liability
constraints are respected (LL1) and (LL2).
It is easy to check that the optimal level of e⁄ort eFB selected by the shareholder
is the one that equates the marginal value of the project with the marginal cost of the
manager￿ s e⁄ort, i.e. eFB is set such that c0(eFB) = ￿V . Since both the manager and the
shareholder are risk neutral, the shareholder has a continuum of possible contracts to o⁄er
to the manager. The set of optimal remuneration schemes (w;￿w) that the shareholder
can o⁄er to the manager that respects the limited liability constraints are of the type
w = c(eFB)￿eFB￿w and any ￿w 2 (0;
c(eFB)
eFB ): Moreover, any contract in this set implies
an expected cost for the shareholder and an expected payment for the manager equal
to c(eFB): In particular, a ￿xed salary, (w;￿w) = (c(eFB);0) is optimal.
Henceforth, we turn to the case where e⁄ort is non-veri￿able, the manager chooses the
one that maximizes his expected utility. This constraint is referred to as the Incentive













Given our assumptions on c(e), we can use the ￿rst order condition of this program instead
of the program itself. In our case, ICC becomes
c
0(e) = ￿w: (ICC)
3 A Code of Best Practice
In this section we de￿ne a Code of Best Practice (CBP hereafter) and consider the incen-
tive e⁄ects derived from its introduction. We pay attention to the optimal contract in two
di⁄erent cases: a case where there is no Code and a second case where the shareholder
adopts the Code. Comparing both situation lead to the optimal shareholder￿ s adoption
decision.
First, the adoption of a Code can improve board control (Dahya et al, 2002). In the
model, we introduce this fact by assuming that the manager will not be able to exert e⁄ort
below certain level e > 0, i.e., the manager decision e has to satisfy e ￿ e: Second, the
CBP rules of behavior generate a cost in the manager￿ s decision-making. The manager
needs time to ful￿ll all Code￿ s requirements. Similarly, the creation of committees or the
need to reach agreements with the independent directors in the board impede a ￿ exible
reaction to the needs of a given project. In the model we consider that the costs from
adopting the Code are borne by the manager. Formally, the manager￿ s cost of e⁄ort
increases from c(e) to ￿c(e) where ￿ > 1.
To sum up, we consider that the Code allows the shareholder to shrink manager￿ s
discretion (by determining a minimum e⁄ort e), but generates some in￿ exibilities to the
manager (captured by ￿). Hence, in our model a CBP is de￿ned by a pair C = (e;￿). We
assume that the adoption of the Code is a discrete decision, i.e. either the ￿rm adopts it
or refuses it, and it cannot be gradually adopted.
We state that the Code C = (e;￿) is rigid when the lower bound set is high since the
manager has almost no room for their own actions whereas we de￿ne that the Code is
￿ exible when e is low.12 Finally, let us highlight that the Regulator is the agent in charge
12Rigidity is, in our view, related to the selection of the rules that reduce manager￿ s discretion, i.e. e
high or low. Intution suggests that a rigid Code goes along with larger costs entailed by the manager
(￿). However, in Section 4 and 5 we focus on all potential Codes that are in the interest of the ￿rm. In








of promoting the Code and the ￿rm take both variables (e and ￿) as given.
3.1 Incentive contract when there is no Code.





SB = [V + e￿V ￿ w ￿ e￿w ￿ I] [P1]
s:t (PC); (ICC); (LL1); (LL2)
In words, the shareholder maximizes the expected pro￿ts requiring that the agent accepts
the contract (PC), has enough incentives (ICC) and is protected by limited liability
(LL1;2).
The optimal contract solving this program is de￿ned by a payment scheme (w;￿w)
that determines the optimal e⁄ort as a function of the parameter of the model, ￿V .
The shareholder can still achieve the ￿rst best e⁄ort by o⁄ering a contract including
￿w = ￿V . However, implementing eFB is not longer optimal, since the manager enjoys
limited liability (w ￿ 0) and obtains informational rents (i.e., manager￿ s utility above his
reservation utility). The shareholder can improve her pro￿ts by limiting the incentives,
i.e. ￿w < ￿V and w = 0. Note that, in this case, SB pro￿ts are ￿SB = V + eSB(￿V ￿
￿w) ￿ I. This is the trade-o⁄ the shareholder faces when dealing with limited liability:
increasing the incentives increases the revenues but it also increases costs. Eventually, the
shareholder prefers a lower level of e⁄ort and saving on incentive costs. We summarize
the optimal payment scheme and the induced level of e⁄ort in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Under asymmetric information on manager￿ s e⁄ort, the optimal payment
scheme (w;￿w) that solves [P1] is de￿ned by:
w = 0;￿w = c
0(e
SB) < ￿V
where eSB is the e⁄ort implemented by the manager. The level of e⁄ort eSB is implicitly
de￿ned by: ￿V = c0(e) + ec00(e).
As compared to the symmetric information outcome, the asymmetry of information
reduces manager￿ s e⁄ort since, as stated above, providing incentives has a cost to the








manager has an informational advantage, the shareholder provides him with informational
rents obtaining more than his outside option. As a consequence, of the reduction of the
manager￿ s e⁄ort, the shareholder reduces her expected pro￿ts. In contrast,
Finally, low-valued projects are not pro￿table when V < I, and the shareholder op-
timally ought to refuse to ￿nance these projects. The agency problem enlarges the set
of projects that the shareholder is not willing to ￿nance (due to eSB < eFB). This
is so because the shareholder anticipates that implementing an e⁄ort that would be
su¢ cient to make the project viable brings too much incentives costs. Let us de￿ne
￿V FB and ￿V SB as the thresholds such that V ￿ I + eFB￿V FB ￿ c(eFB) = 0 and
V ￿ I + eSB￿V SB ￿ eSBc0(eFB) = 0, respectively, being ￿V FB < ￿V SB.
Corollary 1 As compared to the symmetric information allocation (FB), the agency
problem causes that :
(a) both manager￿ s e⁄ort and ￿rm￿ s pro￿t are reduced. This reduction is increasing with
the value of the ￿rm￿ s project.
(b) the manager obtains more than his outside option (EU > 0). These informational
rents increase with the value of the ￿rm￿ s project.
(c) for V < I, the set of projects that are not ￿nanced is enlarged. This occurs if
￿V 2 (￿V FB;￿V SB).
3.2 The Optimal Contract when the Code is Adopted
In this subsection we assume that the Code has been adopted, and we obtain the optimal
contract in this case. Both the incentive and the participation constraints are modi￿ed
when a ￿rm adopts the Code. Solving backwards, the manager chooses the level of e⁄ort






Note that (using First Order Approach) from (ICC0), we obtain the following:
e = e if ￿w ￿ ￿c
0(e)
e > e defined by ￿w = ￿c
0(e) if ￿w > ￿c
0(e):
In words, since the Code forces the manager to make at least an e⁄ort e, the shareholder








and no informational rents allow her to achieve e. Instead, if the shareholder wants to
achieve a higher level of e⁄ort she needs to o⁄er at least ￿w = ￿c0(e): To understand the
incentive condition, imagine that ￿ = 1. In this case, e⁄ort e is obtained at no extra-cost,
namely no informational rents to the manager, while an e⁄ort larger than e would need
an incentive similar to the one without a Code. Since the manager￿ s e⁄ort increases when
the Code is adopted, if ￿ > 1 providing incentives is more expensive for e > e.
The participation constraint of the manager is also modi￿ed. Given a payment scheme,
the manager accepts the contract if w+e￿w￿￿c(e) ￿ 0. Let us call this constraint (PC0).
Thus, the optimal payment scheme (w;￿w) when the Code is adopted is the solution to:
Max
fw;￿w;eg




The following lemma summarizes the optimal contract obtained from solving [P2]. It
states that, for highly valued projects, it is in the shareholder￿ s interest to implement
a large e⁄ort in order to increase chances of success, while if the project is low valued,
the manager receives no informational rents and e is the e⁄ort implemented in order to
save on wages. In Lemma 2, we implicitly de￿ne eCBP as the level of e⁄ort satisfying
c0(e) + ec00(e) = ￿V
￿ , and ￿V CBP is implicitly de￿ned by eCBP(￿V CBP ￿ ￿c0(eCBP)) =
e￿V CBP ￿ ￿c(e).
Lemma 2 If the Code C = (e;￿) is adopted, there is a cut-o⁄ value ￿V CBP such that:
(a) for ￿V ￿ ￿V CBP, any contract (w;￿w) such that ￿w ￿ ￿c0(e) and w = c(e)￿e￿w ￿
0 is optimal. The e⁄ort implemented is e.
(b) for ￿V ￿ ￿V CBP, the optimal contract is (w;￿w) = (0;￿c0(eCBP)). The e⁄ort
implemented is eCBP > e: The manager obtains informational rents in this region.
Note that the level of manager￿ s e⁄ort eCBP < eSB due to the ine¢ ciencies generated
by the adoption of the Code (measured through ￿ > 1).
3.3 The Adoption Decision and Incentives Implication
As stated previously, one of the main characteristics of a Code of Best Practice is that it is








under which the shareholder will decide to adopt the Code and the incentive implications
derived from the adoption of the Code provided by the regulator. The shareholder will
adopt the Code by comparing the level of pro￿ts obtained by the optimal contract stated
in Lemma 1 with the level of pro￿ts obtained by the optimal contract when the Code is
adopted (Lemma 2). Let us de￿ne ￿V (1) and ￿V (2) as the two intersections of ￿(e), the
level of pro￿ts when e is implemented and ￿SB; the level of pro￿ts when the Code is not
adopted (see Appendix for further details).
Let us summarize the comparison of the pro￿ts obtained in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (a) The shareholder adopts voluntarily the Code of Best Practice C =
(e;￿) if and only if the following two conditions hold:
(i) the cost borne by the manager when following the Codes￿recommendations are low
enough (￿ ￿ b ￿ =
ec0(e)
c(e) ) and
(ii) the ￿rm￿ s project takes intermediate values (￿V 2 [￿V (1);￿V (2)]),
otherwise the Code is not adopted.
(b) When the Code is adopted, the level of e⁄ort implemented is always e.
Proposition 1 states that in order to adopt the Code two conditions need to be satis￿ed.
First, it is important that the adoption of the Code does not generate too much costs at
the manager￿ s decisions level, namely ￿ must be low enough. Intuitively, the shareholder
should not adopt the Code if the costs of adopting it (the costs it induces in the managerial
compensation ￿c(e)), is larger than the bene￿t, (the reduction of the informational rents
ec0(e)). This explains the condition in part (i) of Proposition 1. However, this is only a
necessary condition. Part (ii) of Proposition 1 states that a Code should not be adopted
if it induces undesirable level of e⁄orts. This bias can go in either direction. A ￿rm may
refuse the adoption of the Code because its project is low valued and the lower bound e
is too high for the shareholder. This is so because the adoption of the Code implies an
increase in cost wages (up to ￿c(e)) that is not compensated by the increase in revenues
(associated to an increase in the probability of success). It can also be the case that the
￿rm refuses the adoption of the Code when its project has a high expected value because
the Code makes more expensive to provide incentives to the manager. When the project








Since adopting the Code induces some in￿ exibilities (measured through ￿), it is cheaper
to provide incentives refusing the Code rather than adopting it. These two caveats, the
Code forces a too high e⁄ort for low values of the project and implies a high cost of e⁄ort
for high valued projects, explain condition (ii) of Proposition 1.
Figure 1 represents graphically condition (ii) of Proposition 1. We depict the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿ts when the Code is adopted (￿CBP) and compare them to the level of pro￿ts when
it is not adopted (￿SB). Note that ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts obtained by adopting the Code (￿CBP)
are shaped by the functions ￿SB(￿ > 1) and ￿(e;￿ > 1), as it is explained in Lemma 2.
By comparing both functions, we observe that the adoption of the Code is only pro￿table
for projects with intermediate values. Note also that if ￿ increases, ￿CBP shifts clock wise
while ￿SB remains unchanged, which implies that for large values of ￿ the CBP is not
adopted (part (i) of Proposition 1)
AV
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Figure 1: The Adoption decision as a funtion of the ￿rm￿ s value
Finally, from Proposition 1 we conclude that the e⁄ort implemented is always e: Indeed,








manager to achieve at least the minimum level of e⁄ort without providing informational
rents. Proposition 2 highlights that this e⁄ect is not always associated with a better
manager￿ s performance.
Proposition 2 When the ￿rm adopts voluntarily the Code C = (e;￿) it may be the case
that, as compared with the case where there is no Code,
(a) the manager increases his e⁄ort. This situation takes place for ￿V 2 [￿V (1);c0(e)+
ec00(e)].
(b) the manager￿ s e⁄ort is reduced. This situation arises for ￿V 2 (c0(e)+ec00(e);￿V (2)].
Part (a) of Proposition 2 refers to the case where there is an increase of the man-
ager￿ s e⁄ort. The Code allows the shareholder to demand e while without it, the contract
(Lemma 1) would have implemented a lower e⁄ort. On the contrary, part (b) of Propo-
sition 2 shows the cases where the adoption of the Code reduces manager￿ s e⁄ort. If
no Code is available, incentives are provided via informational rents. When a Code is
available, in this region it is optimal for the shareholder to design a payment scheme
implementing e. The rationale for this decision is that the shareholder compares the loss
in revenues (a reduction in the probability of success e < eSB) with the saving in wages
(c(e)￿ < eSBc0(eSB)).
Agency problems causes the shareholder to implement a level of e⁄ort lower than the
e¢ cient one (Corollary 1). Proposition 2 states that adopting the Code is not always
a good device for correcting this biais. Part (b) of Proposition 2 shows the case where
this biais increase: adopting the Code goes along with a decrease in the ￿rm￿ s e¢ ciency
(measured through manager￿ s e⁄ort, (eFB ￿ e) > (eFB ￿ eSB) > 0 for all ￿V ￿ c0(e) +
ec00(e)). Part (a) of Proposition 2 shows the cases where this bias might be reduced. In
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Figure 2: The CBP increases manager￿ s e⁄ort in region (a)
and in region (b) reduces manager￿ s e⁄ort
We illustrate the main arguments stated in Proposition 2 graphically. Part (a) in
Figure 2 include cases where pro￿ts increase by both increasing e⁄ort and eliminating
informational rents while the cases where the pro￿ts increase by extracting rents to the
manager and reducing his e⁄ort are depicted in part (b) of Figure 2.
Finally, suppose that the cost that the manager incurs when the Code is adopted
is reduced (￿ ! 1), then the ￿rm adopts the Code more often (
d￿V (1)
d￿ > 0 >
d￿V (2)
d￿ ).
In the limit, i.e, if the Code does not lead to any cost for the manager (￿ = 1), the
shareholder would be indi⁄erent between adopting and refusing for large values of the
project (￿V ￿ ￿V (2)) while she would still prefer refusing it for low values of the Code
(￿V ￿ ￿V (1)). Indeed, in this case, the ￿rm can achieve FB￿ s pro￿ts by adopting the
Code for ￿V = c0(eFB) 2 (￿V (1);￿V (2)). Furthermore, we may ask about the e⁄ects
of the CBP if it induces e¢ ciency gains in the manager￿ s cost of e⁄ort (￿ < 1). In this
case, only ￿rms with low valued projects have no incentives to adopt the Code, otherwise,
there is a strict preference for adopting it. The intuition for low valued projects remains
unchanged, since the lower bound e is too high for that set of ￿rms. Obviously, since








incentive to adopt the Code.
4 Investment Decisions
The aim of this section is to analyze the role that a Code of best practice may play at
improving investment level I. We assume that in this Section that the level of investment
I is endogenous. It is decided by the shareholder before the contract is designed and it
is observable by the manager. In this framework, we distinguish two potential distortions
caused by the agency problem. Distortions at the level of investment and pro￿table
projects are not ￿nanced. We assume that the realization of the project depends positively
on the amount invested at t = 1. If the outcome is "success" the payo⁄ is V (I), and the
payo⁄is V (I) if the outcome is "failure" with V
0
(I) > 0 and V
0(I) > 0 and we will denote
￿V (I) ￿ [V (I) ￿ V (I)] being ￿V (I) ￿ 0 for all I. Therefore, the expected value of the
project becomes
(1 ￿ e)V (I) + eV (I) = V (I) + e￿V (I):
By backwards induction, the shareholder decides on the optimal investment taking into
account the contract she will be o⁄ering to the manager. If the manager￿ s e⁄ort is veri￿able
the shareholder will implement eFB(I) (de￿ned in Section 2) satisfying ￿V (I) = c0(eFB).
When the manager￿ s e⁄ort is not veri￿able and there is no CBP, in the continuation of
the game, she will implement eSB(I) (de￿ned in Section 3) satisfying ￿V (I) = c0(eSB) +
eSBc00(eSB), which, as always, implies a distortion in the level of e⁄ort associated to the
agency problem, i.e. eSB(I) < eFB(I) for any I.
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4.1 Distortions at the Investment level
The distortions that the agency problem causes on the level of the investment depends








in which increasing the investment increases the mean of the project but also its risk
(￿V 0(I) > 0). In turn, this a⁄ects the level of the e⁄ort. In other words, the level
of investment and the level of e⁄ort are strategic complements. On the contrary, there
might be projects in which a larger level of investment reduces the risk of the project
(￿V 0(I) < 0). This a⁄ects negatively the level of e⁄ort. In other words, the level of
investment and the level of e⁄ort are strategic substitutes.
In the former case, the complementarity assumption implies that the larger the size
of the project, the more crucial the role played by the manager is in its expected value.
Therefore, an increase in the level of investment makes the agency problem more acute.
In the latter case, when e⁄ort and investment are strategic substitutes, the larger the
project is, the less important the role played by the manager. In other words, investment
can be seen as an instrument alleviating the agency problem.
Under complementarity, the marginal pro￿tability of the project increases with the
initial investment (￿V 0(I) > 0), which in turn imply that the optimal level of e⁄ort
tends to increase with the level of investment (deFB
dI > deSB
dI > 0). The shareholder uses
strategically the level of investment as a device for correcting manager￿ s behavior. Due to
the complementarity e⁄ect, she anticipates that a large level of investment would imply
paying a large level of informational rents. The shareholder optimally limits this amount
by reducing the level of investment when e⁄ort is not veri￿able. Under substitution
between e⁄ort and investment, the shareholder increases the level of investment because
it can reduce the cost paid to the manager.
Let us presents formally this result in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 When e⁄ort and investment are strategic complements (￿V 0(I) > 0), agency
problem generates underinvestment, i.e. ISB < IFB. Instead, when e⁄ort and investment
are strategic substitutes, agency problem generates overinvestment, i.e. ISB > IFB
A natural question is under which conditions a code might help to reduce at least par-
tially the underinvestment (overinvestment).13 In a nutshell, the code may both palliate
or reinforce the underinvestment problem. The intuition is the following: as showed in
Section 3 the Code allow the shareholder to implement e. This implies that she imple-
ments this minimum level of e⁄ort without providing incentives, and this is precisely the
13The intuition for the case of substitution are the opposite than the case of complementarity. The








main reason why the shareholder is willing to adopt the Code . Therefore and due to the
complementarity e⁄ect, if a Code is relaxed, namely e low, it may induce the shareholder
to underinvest. Analogously, if the Code is intrusive, namely e high, the shareholder
might overshoot when deciding the investment level (relative to the FB) if the Code is
adopted.
Parallel to the case where there is no code, the optimal investment level ICBP solves:14
I
CBP 2 argmaxfV (I) + e￿V (I) ￿ I ￿ c(e)g
To present the results on investment when the Code is adopted, let us de￿ne e1 and e2
as c0(e1)+e1c00(e1) = ￿V (I) and c0(e2) = ￿V (I); respectively. These thresholds are such
that the investment chosen when e = e1 coincides with ISB and the investment chosen
when e = e2 coincides with IFB.
Lemma 4 When e⁄ort and investment are complements, if the Code C = (e;￿) is
adopted, the investment ICBP is such that:
ICBP 2
(Imin;ISB] if e 2 (0;e1]
(ISB;IFB] if e 2 (e1;e2]
(IFB;Imax) if e 2 (e2;1)
where Imin solves V
0(I) = 1 and Imax solves V
0(I) + ￿V 0(I) = 1:
When e⁄ort and investment are substitutes, if the Code C = (e;￿) is adopted, the invest-
ment ICBP is such that:
ICBP 2
(Imin;IFB] if e 2 (0;e1]
(ISB;ISB] if e 2 (e1;e2]
(ISB;Imax) if e 2 (e2;1)
Lemma 4 shows that if the Code is adopted, it alleviates the distortion outcome only
if e 2 (e1;e2]. In contrast, if the Code is either too relaxed or too intrusive, adopting the
Code induces the ￿rm to underinvest if e 2 (0;e1] or overinvest if e 2 (e2;1). Finally,
since ￿rms decide voluntarily to adopt or not the CBP, we consider the adoption decision
and the manager￿ s e⁄ort.
14As showed in the previous Section, it is not optimal to adopt the code and implementing a larger
level of e⁄ort than the minimal guaranteed by the code. This is because adopting the Code causes an








Proposition 3 The Code C = (e;￿) is adopted if two conditions hold: ￿ < b ￿ and e 2
(eCBP
1 (￿);eCBP
2 (￿)] with eCBP
1 (￿) < e1 < eCBP
2 (￿):
Proposition 3 is analogous to Proposition 1: the shareholder adopts the Code because
it lets the shareholder extract rents to the manager (vis-a-vis a situation where there is
no Code in the economy). Thus, a Code is adopted when the ine¢ ciencies generated at
the manager￿ s level are not very high (￿ < b ￿) and e takes intermediate values.
Lemma 4 states that when e 2 (e1;e2] the Code partially alleviates the fact that
￿rms underinvest. Nevertheless, Proposition 4 states that this is not always the case
and underinvestment might be reinforced, namely ICBP < ISB. This takes place if the
CBP is very relaxed and implements e 2 (eCBP
1 ;e1]: For instance, assume that e = e1,
then by Lemma 4, we know that the level of investment if the Code is adopted coincides
with the investment if the code is not adopted. Yet, the level of pro￿ts are larger if the
Code is adopted because of the informational rents. Therefore, a ￿rm will be willing to
adopt a more relaxed Code. This Code, due to complementarity, makes the shareholder
to select a lower level of investment. Quite interesting, we also ￿nd that very rigid Codes
are not always good because, in this case, we may face overinvestment (ICBP > IFB).
Overinvestment only arise if the Code is very intrusive and the costs associated are also
very low. To see how, assume that the Code provided is b C = (e2;1). Then, both the
investment and of pro￿ts coincide with the FB situation. If the ￿rm adopts a Code a bit
more intrusive than b C, the shareholder selects a larger level of investment. This situation
takes place if e 2 [e2;eC
2 (￿)]. 15
We can represent the investment levels graphically. In Figure 3, corresponding to a
low value ￿, we illustrate the investment selected when the Code is adopted and compare
it with the FB and SB levels as a function of e. Neither the FB nor the SB level of e⁄ort
depend on e and from Lemma 4 we know that ISB < IFB. On the contrary, if the CBP
is adopted, the level of investment does depend on e (positively due to complementarity).
Note that the level of investment induced by the adoption of the Code corrects the bias
when e 2 (e1;e2). An undesirable situation, though, arises outside this interval. The
shareholder is still willing to adopt the Code, but it distorts the investment level and
15Note that the set of potential Codes that causes overinvestment might be empty, since it seems
natural to consider that a large level of e⁄ort implies a large level of costs. Yet, the Code is taken as








either underinvestment (e 2 (eCBP
1 ;e1)) or overinvestment ((e 2 (e2;eCBP
2 ))) might come
out.








Figure 3: Optimal Investment if a Code is adopted compared to the
SB level and the FB level.
For high values of ￿; i.e. if eC
2 < e2, overinvestment cannot arise in equilibrium and
very rigid Codes help to alleviate that ￿rms correct the underinvestment bias.
Finally, let us highlight that the adoption of the Code might alleviate another distor-
tion caused by the agency problem: there might be situations where the shareholder does
not provide funds to a pro￿table project, i.e. in the FB the ￿rm obtains positive proceeds,
because of the agency problem, as already appointed in Corollary 1. The intuition is that
a ￿rm adopts the code since pro￿ts increase. If there are projects that were not ￿nanced,
it is plausible that by adopting this projects will be adopted.
5 Policy Implications.
In the previous sections, a ￿rm has access to a given Code and we analyze its adoption
is optimal and the implications that a Code has on certain decisions such as investment
level. The purpose of this section is to consider which Code the regulator should promote








regulator wants to protect the shareholder which in turn imply that the regulator will
maximize ￿rms￿pro￿ts. In other words, we want to identify the Code that the regulator
ought to design when it faces a population of ￿rms as a function of ￿rms￿characteristics
and the technology to build up Codes.
5.1 Regulator￿ s technology
A Code entails the guaranty of a minimum level of e⁄ort (e) and an increase in the
manager￿ s cost (￿). We assume that the regulator can design di⁄erent Codes, some very
intrusive (i.e. high e and ￿), other very relaxed or "laissez-faire" (low e and ￿). For the
sake of simplicity, let us consider the following linear regulator￿ s technology:
￿(e) = 1 + be (CC)
where b > 0.16 The parameter b describes the regulator￿ s ability. Di⁄erent regulators
might own di⁄erent pieces of information about the governance of ￿rms acting in the
market. This e⁄ect can be interpreted in this model by considering di⁄erent values of the
parameter b:
The regulator faces a population of ￿rms characterized by its project ￿V and uniformly
distributed on the interval [0;￿V ].17 We denote by ￿(e;￿(e);￿V ) ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts having a
project with value ￿V , and the sharholder can adopt a Code C = (e;￿(e)). Then, the









s:t ￿(e) = 1 + be
The regulator￿ s objective function is to maximize the sum of the ￿rms￿pro￿ts and we
assume that the regulator cares only about improving the aggregated value of the ￿rms
acting in the market. Therefore, a ￿rst intuition would suggest that the regulator would
like to choose rigid rules in order to let very good ￿rms (namely, ￿rms with valuable
16The results does not depend on the functional form as long as non-(strict) concavity holds. The
linear technology helps us to explain the solution of the regulator in a simpler way.









projects - high ￿V ) adopt the Code . Nevertheless, the regulator￿ s willingness to promote
rigid rules is limited by the ine¢ ciencies caused by the Code itself. Hence, the regulator
chooses e (which has a given b associated) in such a way that the marginal bene￿ts from
adopting the Code equates the marginal costs from adopting it. The marginal revenues
are equal to the aggregated average of ￿rms adopting the Code (LHS in the following
equation), while the marginal costs are equal the costs of rewarding a larger e⁄ort plus
the increased cost associated (LHS of the following expression):
￿V (1) + ￿V (2)
2
= c
0(e) + b(c(e) + ec
0(e))
Clearly, a more e¢ cient regulator￿ s technology, caeteris paribus, let the regulator opt
for more stringent Codes.
On the other hand, if ￿rms are more concentrated, in the sense that the upper limit of
the distribution is lower keeping ￿xed the mean, the regulator ￿nds optimal to promote
a more relaxed Code. It is still true that the regulator has still interest in increasing the
lower bound of the Code, yet in this case, since there are less ￿rms with very valuable
projects, the regulator would be concern on the bene￿ts of ￿rms of intermediate value.
The following proposition summarizes the optimal solution of the program faced by the
regulator:
Proposition 4 Consider that ￿rms are distributed uniformly on the interval [0;￿V ] and
￿(e) = 1+be: Then, the regulator opts for a Code where the rules implement a minimum
level of e⁄ort positive, i.e. e > 0: Besides, the optimal bound e depends on
(a) the regulator￿ s technology (
de
db < 0)
(b) the distribution of ￿rms. Consider that ￿V is distributed uniformly on [￿V ;￿V ] the
more dispersed the ￿rms are, the more rigid the Code (
de
d￿V > 0)
Proposition 5 shows that the regulator should promote di⁄erent codes when it faces
di⁄erent ￿rm￿ s distribution. A consequence of this statement is that heterogeneity in the
design of Codes may not necessarily imply that some codes are superior to others. Take
two codes A and B such that eA > eB and bA = bB. If the market has very good projects,
the regulator should consider the creation of codes as rigid as possible in order to alleviate
the agency problem of the ￿rms with more valuable projects. This rationalizes the choice








using code B is not suboptimal. Consider, in this case, would have chosen code A. The
reduction of agency problem would only bene￿ts very few ￿rms. A more ￿ exible Code such
as B will allow more ￿rms to be interested in adopting it generating a higher performance
for the overall market. To sum up, for di⁄erent distribution of ￿rms a regulator, with
a given ability to design Codes, will take di⁄erent decisions and just by comparing the
Codes we cannot conclude that the Code A is better than the Code B.
A similar argument can be constructed through the technology that the manager owns.
Di⁄erent countries have di⁄erent regulators that may have di⁄erent technologies to design
Codes. Take two Codes A and B such that eA = eB and bA < bB. In this case, we can
conclude that Code A is superior to Code B. However, note that for some regulators
Code A can be unfeasible. The heterogeneity in the technology may come from di⁄erent
sources like informational asymmetries or other in￿ uences by agents acting in the market.
In the latter, Jones and Pollit (2001) suggest that the improvements on the Code in UK
has been subject to the di⁄erent players in the market. In particular, academics, the mass
media, insiders and investment groups have tried to in￿ uence the Code in one or in other
way. These pressures have translated into changes in the Code since in our wording they
a⁄ect the regulation￿ s technology. For instance, insiders would like to have a Code as
￿ exible as possible in order to avoid a battle for rents, which in our model would re￿ ect
in a higher b. Roughly speaking, heterogeneity of Codes suggests, in this case, that a
￿ exible Code signals an ine¢ cient regulator, which implies that Codes can be ranked by
its severity.
Finally, let us remark that the predictions of our model are subject to the selected
distribution (uniform distribution). However, our model would not change qualitatively
if we allow for more general distributions. Let us ￿x the upper limit of the distribution
￿V . If instead of having a uniform population, we would have a distribution where ￿rms
tend to have good projects, i.e. the probability is increasing in ￿V , the incentives for the
regulator to increase e are reinforced since there are more ￿rms involved in larger valued
projects. Hence, the regulator will choose the most rigid Code. On the contrary, if ￿rms
are concentrated in low valued projects, the density is decreasing in ￿V , the regulator








6 Conclusions and Further research.
This paper focuses on the role of a Code of Best Practice as an incentive device. We
propose a very simple agency model where the shareholder (principal) decides on the
adoption of the Code, depending on its e⁄ects on pro￿ts. We also consider the design of
the Code by a regulator concerned by the e¢ ciency of its population of ￿rms.
We de￿ne a Code as a mechanism allowing the shareholder to shrink manager￿ s dis-
cretion. We show that there are ￿rms whose shareholders optimally choose not to adopt
the Code, either it implements a too high level of activity or the Code imposes costs
at operating structures, reducing the time that the manager devotes to the needs of a
project. Among the ￿rms that do adopt the Code, e¢ ciency may increase or decrease. In
some cases, the Code induces a better manager￿ s behavior due to an increase in board￿ s
oversight. In other cases, the Code only allows to reduce rents at the cost of a lower e⁄ort.
Using our results of the e⁄ects of the Code on ￿rm￿ s e¢ ciency, we investigate the
role that a Code of best Practice may play regarding investment decisions. In our frame-
work, investment decisions are distorted due to the agency problem. We concentrate on
two possible distortions: underinvestment and pro￿table projects remain un￿nanced. In
regard to the ￿rst distortion, we show that a Code is a good mechanism only under cer-
tain conditions. If a very relaxed Code is promoted, we show that underinvestment is
reinforced. Very stringent Codes solve underinvestment but ￿rms might overshoot when
selecting the optimal investment level. A code is also proved to be useful when dealing
with the second distortion. Under ￿nancial restrictions in the ￿nancial market, the Code
helps the shareholder to ￿nance projects that would remain un￿nanced. In this situation,
any Code that is voluntarily accepted by the ￿rm has this positive e⁄ect.
Concerning our result regarding the adoption decision, the literature provides evidence
suggesting that if the manager owns a large fraction of ￿rm￿ s shares, there are less incen-
tives for the ￿rm to adopt the Code.18 We can provide two possible explanations for this
evidence. First, if the manager owns a larger fraction of the ￿rm, the agency problem
associated with the separation of ownership and control is smoothed. Second, a manager
18Young (2000) and Dedman (2000) con￿rm empirically this result.We also ￿nd evidence in the descrip-
tive analysis provided by Dahya et al (2002). For instance, they highlight as one of the characteristics of
the ￿rms that do not adopt the Code the fact that the best payed executive owns between 3 and 4 times








owning a large set of shares may have enough power to block the adoption of the Code.
Our model suggests that this second argument makes sense if the adoption of the Code
induces a battle for rents. In such a case, the manager has incentives to avoid the adoption
because it harms his utility.
In this paper, we also tackle the optimal Code that a shareholder￿ s oriented regulator
should promote. Our result of the analysis suggests that it might be optimal to promote
a ￿ exible Code, meaning that the manager has more discretion, if the regulator faces low
valued population of ￿rms. Hence, the heterogeneity of Codes that we perceive in reality,
in the sense that there exist coexistence, may be rational because they cannot be ranked.
We also deal with deal with the regulator￿ s ability. In this dimension, caeteris paribus,
we do rank the Codes, since the better the regulator￿ s technology is (b low), the better
the Code of Best Practice is.
To our knowledge, this is one of the ￿rst attempts to provide a model of Codes of Best
Practice. Even if we abstract from several important issues that a Code of Best Practice
takes into account, we think that we can explain important features. Other issues relevant
in the Code of Best Practice are the role played by the institutional investors in controlling
managers, the need for an improvement in the quality of the information provided to the
investor as well as the role played by the capital structure. In particular, and given the
evidence presented before, we consider that capital structure or who is in charge of the
decision of adopting the Code may be crucial to explain the e⁄ectiveness of one Code
respect to others.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We solve [P1]. First, we notice that [LL2] cannot be binding due
to (ICC) and (LL1). Second, (PC) is also not binding. Indeed, using (ICC), (PC) can
be rewritten as w + ec0(e) ￿ c(e) > w for any e > 0. Therefore (LL1) implies (PC). Let
L(w;e;￿) = V ￿ I + e￿V ￿ w ￿ ec0(e) + ￿w be the lagrangian corresponding to [P1], ￿
is the lagrange multiplier associated to (LL1) respectively. The FOC￿ s with respect to w





The second equation de￿nes eSB. From the ￿rst equation, (LL1) is binding, since ￿ = 1,
hence w = 0: Finally, the ICC implies that ￿w = c0(eSB):
Proof of Corollary 1. Part (a) of the corollary is proved by comparing the implicit
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2c00(eSB)+ec000(eSB) > 0. Finally note that d￿FB
d￿V = eFB > d￿SB
d￿V = eSB:
It is also clear that EUm = ec0(eSB) ￿ c(eSB) > 0. Also, dEUm
d￿V = eSBc00(eSB)deSB
d￿V > 0








Since ￿FB = (V ￿ I) + eSB￿V ￿ eSBc0(eSB) and ￿SB = (V ￿ I) + eSB￿V ￿ eSBc0(eSB):
Then, noting that ￿FB(￿V = 0) = ￿SB(￿V = 0) < 0, and d￿FB
d￿V > d￿SB
d￿V > 0 imply that
￿V FB > ￿V SB > 0 exist and they are unique.
Proof of Lemma 2. We solve [P2]. The manager cannot exert e⁄orts below e and
manager￿ s costs switch from c() to ￿c(): Hence, we need to analyze two di⁄erent programs:
the case where e ￿ e which means that e = e and the case where e > e.
(a) In the ￿rst case, if e = e; the solution to this program is obtained by solving
Max
fw;￿wg
[V + e￿V ￿ w ￿ e￿w ￿ I]
s:t w + e￿w ￿ ￿c(e); ￿w ￿ ￿c
0(e); ￿w ￿ 0; w ￿ 0:
Note that the objective function consists on minimizing the expected manager￿ s payment
(w + e￿w). Hence, the solution is any pair (w;￿w) ￿ 0 such that (PC) binds and
￿w < ￿c0(e). Note that since w + e￿c0(e) ￿ ￿c(e), it is the case that ￿w < ￿c0(e).
Therefore, if e is implemented ￿(e) = V ￿ I + e￿V ￿ ￿c(e), which is an increasing linear
function of ￿V:
(b) In the latter case, e > e the program is slighty di⁄erent to the one solved in Lemma
1. It is exactly the same but ￿w = ￿c0(e) and the manager￿ s cost changing from c(e) to
￿c(e): Therefore, let L(w;e;￿;￿) = V ￿ I + e￿V ￿ w ￿ ￿ec0(e) + ￿w be the lagrangian
corresponding to this case. The FOC￿ s of this program are
￿ = 1 and ￿V = ￿(c
0(e) + c
00(e)e)
In this case, the optimal e⁄ort eCBP is de￿ned implicitly by the second equation. Note
that EU > 0 (PC) is not binding due to ￿ = 1. Therefore, if eCBP is implemented
￿(eCBP) = V ￿I +eCBP￿V ￿￿eCBPc0(eCBP), which is an increasing and strictly convex
function of ￿V:
(c) Finally, comparing (a) and (b), we derive the threshold ￿V CBP: If ￿V 2 [0;￿(c0(e)+
c00(e)e)] the level of e⁄ort must be the minimum level of e⁄ort e since eCBP < e. Also,
at ￿V = ￿(c0(e) + c00(e)e); e = eCBP and ￿(e) > ￿(eCBP) since EU > 0 if eCBP is the
e⁄ort implemented, and EU = 0 otherwise. Finally since ￿(e) is linear increasing while
￿(eCBP) is strictly convex and ￿(e) j￿V =0< ￿(eCBP) j￿V =0= 0; both function cross only








sum up, the pro￿t function is:
￿
CBP =
(V ￿ I) + e￿V ￿ ￿c(e) if ￿V ￿ ￿V CBP
(V ￿ I) + eCBP￿V ￿ ￿eCBPc0(eCBP) if ￿V ￿ ￿V CBP
which is continuous and d￿CBP
d￿V > 0:
Proof of Proposition 1. Proving Proposition needs to compare ￿SBand ￿CBP.
The shareholder adopts the Code if ￿SB < ￿CBP: First of all, note that if ￿V ￿
￿V CBPchoosing the Code is a dominated strategy: eFB > eSB > eCBP and ￿ > 1
which implies that ￿CBP = (V ￿ I) + eCBP￿V ￿ ￿eCBPc0(eCBP) < ￿SB = (V ￿ I) +
eSB￿V ￿ eSBc0(eSB). For ￿V ￿ ￿V CBP; since ￿CBP is an increasing linear func-
tion with ￿CBP(￿V = 0) < 0 while ￿SB is a convex and increasing function with
￿SB(￿V = 0) = 0. Then, since lim
￿V !1
￿SB = 1 if both function cross they do it twice.
Note that d￿SB
d￿ = 0 > d￿CBP
d￿ . This implies that if ￿ is large enough both function do not
cross each other.
Let us assume that ￿ = 1; then both functions cross twice since at ￿V = 0 ￿SB > ￿CBP
while at ￿V = c0(e) + ec00(e) ! ￿SB < ￿CBPsincee = eSB and c(e) < eSBc0(eSB) by
convexity of c(). Consider now ￿ =
ec0(e)
c(e) ; then at ￿V = c0(e) + ec00(e) ￿SB = ￿CBP,
which in turn imply that ￿SB > ￿CBP for ￿V 6= c0(e) + ec00(e) since ￿SB is convex while
￿CBP is linear and ￿SB(￿V = 0) = 0 > ￿CBP(￿V = 0): Therefore, if ￿ 2 (1;
ec0(e)
c(e) )
￿CBP > ￿SB if ￿V 2 [￿V (1);￿V (2)] where ￿V (1);￿V (2) are obtained implicitly by
solving ￿SB = ￿CBP whenever ￿ 2 (1;
ec0(e)
c(e) ):
Proof of Proposition 2. Since the ￿rm adopts the Code, it implies that ￿V 2
[￿V (1);￿V (2)] (see Proof of Proposition 1). From Proposition 1 it is also clear that
￿V (1) < c0(e) + ec00(e) < ￿V (2). Finally, note that eSB is an increasing function of ￿V
while the minimum level of e⁄ort is independent of ￿V: Therefore, eSB < e if ￿V 2
[￿V (1);c0(e) + ec00(e)] while eSB > e if ￿V 2 [c0(e) + ec00(e);￿V (2)]:
Proof of Lemma 3. This proof is obtained by deriving the FB program and the
SB program respectively:
I
FB 2 argmaxfV (I) + e
FB(I)￿V (I) ￿ I ￿ c(e
FB(I))g
FOC = 0 () V
0(I) + e
FB(I)￿V










SB 2 argmaxfV (I) + e
SB(I)￿V (I) ￿ I ￿ c(e
SB(I))g
FOC = 0 () V
0(I) + e
SB(I)￿V
0(I) ￿ 1 = 0
Finally we can guarantee that the interior solution is well de￿ned if SOC < 0. This hap-
pens whenever the marginal pro￿tability is not huge enough, since if larger the optimum










0(0) > 1 let us guarantee that the solution always exists. Hence, we only need to
compare both solutions and since eFB(I) > eSB(I) it is the case that ISB < IFB when
￿V 0(I) > 0 and ISB > IFB when ￿V 0(I) < 0:
Proof of Lemma 4. If a ￿rm adopts the Code, the level of investment depends on
the rules selected, which implement e. Analogously to the previous Lemma,
I
CBP 2 argmaxfV (I) + e￿V (I) ￿ I ￿ ￿c(e)g




CBP) ￿ 1 = 0
and the SOC < 0 since V
00(ICBP)+e￿V 00(ICBP) < 0. Note that by di⁄erentiating totally






00(IC) + e￿V 00(IC)
which is positive for complements and negative for substitutes and let us de￿ne V
0(Imin) =
1 and V
0(Imax)+￿V 0(Imax) = 1: From Lemma 3 and these de￿nitions we can notice that
Imin < ISB < IFB < Imax if complements and the reverse if complements. Therefore,
we only need to realize that at c0(e1) + e1c00(e1) = ￿V 0(I) e1 coincides with eSB; and e2
coincides with eFB at c0(e2) = ￿V 0(I). This proves Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us prove the conditions for adopting the Code. Note
that the level of pro￿ts obtained if the Code is adopted are
￿
CBP = V (I























where we have used the envelope theorem in obtaining the FOC and SOC if the marginal
pro￿tabilities are not large enough. As we can observe both the level of pro￿ts as well
as the optimal minimum level of e⁄ort decreases if ￿ increases. If b ￿ =
ec0(e)
c(e) ; e = e1 =
eSB(ISB), and moreover, at e = e1 ￿C = ￿SB, which in turn imply that if ￿ > b ￿ the
shareholder does not adopt the Code. Therefore, if ￿ < b ￿, we have that at e1 ￿C > ￿SB.
Given that ￿C is concave in regard e while ￿SB is constant respect e, then ￿C = ￿SB are
equal in two points eC
1 and eC
2 . Moreover eC
1 < e1 < eC
2 .
Part 2 of Proposition 1 is derived from the previous analysis. We know that the Code is
adopted if eC
1 < e1 < eC
2 , then if e 2 (eC
1 ;e1), the level of Investment selected if the Code
is adopted is lower than the SB situation, as we showed in Proof of Lemma 3. Similarly if
e > e1 we have that underinvestment e⁄ect is alleviated (IC > ISB). Assume that ￿ = 1,
then it is clear to realize that eC
1 < e2 < eC
2 due to the concavity of ￿C since the maximum
is achieved at e2. Therefore, as long as ￿FB > ￿SB we have e2 < eC
2 : Finally and as we
showed before, if ￿ = b ￿ eC
1 = e1 = eC
2 < e2:
Therefore, this implies that, by continuity, there exists a ￿ = e ￿ such that e2 = eC
2 : This
proves the last part of Proposition 3 since if the Code is very rigid and ￿ < e ￿ we obtain
that e 2 (e2;eC
2 ) which in turn imply that IC > IFB.


















s:t ￿(e) = (1 + be)


























and manipulating this expression, we obtain


























SOC can be rewritten in the following way:
d￿V (2)
de





[￿V (1) ￿ ￿(e)c
0(e) + ￿
0(e)c(e)]









￿V (2) ￿ ￿(e)c0(e) + ￿
0(e)c(e)





￿V (2) ￿ ￿V (1)





￿V (1) ￿ ￿(e)c0(e) + ￿
0(e)c(e)





￿V (1) ￿ ￿V (2)
eSB(￿V (1)) ￿ e
] > 0
where the last equality is obtained by applying FOC. Let us introduce these equations in




￿V (2) ￿ ￿V (1)
eSB(￿V (2)) ￿ e
](






￿V (1) ￿ ￿V (2)
eSB(￿V (1)) ￿ e
](
￿V (2) ￿ ￿V (1)
2
)









￿V (2) ￿ ￿V (1)
eSB(￿V (2)) ￿ e
+
￿V (1) ￿ ￿V (2)










eSB(￿V (2)) ￿ e
￿
1






which implies that SOC holds as long as the regulator technology as well as the manager￿ s
cost are convex enough.
Note also that if the regulator￿ s program has an optimum for this general function, it is

















Recall from the part (a) of this proof that @FOC


































e ￿ eSB(￿V (2))
< 0
where eSB(￿V (i)) is the SB e⁄ort evaluated at ￿V (i) i 2 f1;2g: This implies that
the larger is b the less are the number of ￿rms willing to adopt the Code. This means
that we can derive a b large enough such that ￿V (1) = ￿V (2) which means that the
derivative would have a negative sign. A su¢ cient condition for this to be true is e ￿
eSB(￿V (1))+eSB(￿V (2))
2 .
Comparative stattics regarding the upper limit bound of the distribution. Consider now
that the upper limit of the distribution is low enough. In particular, let us assume that











￿(e)d￿V g s:t ￿ = ￿(e)
then the FOC can also be rewritten as





where ￿V < ￿V (2) which in turn imply that the minimum level of e⁄ort e must be lower
than in the previous case. This is true since the RHS is an increasing function of e:
33